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CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
AND THE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT
ARTHUR F. MATHEWS*
Although the law relating to investment companies _has developed
substantially during the past decade,i little, has been written concerning
the criminal provisions of the Investment Company Act of 19402 (1940
Act) and its companion statute, the Investment Advisers Act° (Ad-
visers Act). The absence of scholarly analysis regarding the criminal
sanctions in these statutes perhaps 'is attributable to the paucity of
prosecutions sought under either law . 4 However, the recent decision of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Deutsch, 5 the
first criminal action to be brought under , the "self-dealing" proscrip-
tions of the 1940 Act,° has generated' a renewed interest in the criminal
provisions of that Act.
This article examines th6 specific criminal provisions of both the
1940 Act and the Advisers Act and analyzes the prosecutions brought
under each statute. Primary emphasis will be placed on the Deutsch
court's interpretation of Section 17(e) (1) of the 1940 Act. In addition,
the article will discuss the ambiguity existing in the criminal provisions
of both statutes, in light of the proposed revision of these laws under
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code. 7 It is the conclusion of this
author that the Deutsch cour't's broad interpretation of the 1940 Act
will serve to ease the government's burden of proof in actions brought
under the Act and thereby increase the statute's deterrent effect.
* WA., Union College, 1959; 'M., Albany Law School of Union University, 1962;
LL.M., Georgetown University, 1964; Member of the District of Columbia and New Y ork
Bars; Associate Professorial Lecturer in Securities Regulation, George Washington Uni-
versity Law Center. The author was formerly Deputy Associate Director (Enforcement)
of ,the Division of Trading and Markets at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
for several years was in charge of the Office of Criminal Reference and Special Pro-
ceedings.
1 See generally Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
Dec. 14, 1970. See also Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual
Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-37 (1962); SEC Institutional In-
vestor Study, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2 15 U.S.C. H 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1970).
4
 Apparently there have been only nine prosecutions under the 1940 Act and the
Advisers Act. See notes 25-34 and accompanying text infra.
5 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 92 S. Ct. 682 (1972).
o 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1970).
7
 Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
A Proposed New Federal Criminal. Code, (1971).
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administers six
separate federal statutes, all containing criminal provisions: the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),8 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act),8 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1935
Act)," the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (1939 Act)," the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act. Unlike the
Mail Fraud" and Wire Fraud" statutes, the securities statutes gen-
erally do not designate specific acts as crimes. Instead, they contain
"penalty" provisions" which encompass, with one exception," three
operative sections: (a) a general proscription which makes the willful
violation of any substantive provision of the statute, or any rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder, a crime; (b) a specific proscription
which renders certain willful false filings made pursuant to the statute
criminal acts; and (c) a provision which prescribes maximum penalties
to be imposed upon conviction. The criminal sanctions of both the
1940 Act and the Advisers Act are patterned after the more familiar
criminal provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts."
8 15 U.S.C. H 77a et seq. (1970).
9 15 U.S.C. H 78a et seq. (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 et seq. (1970).
11 15 U.S.C.	 77aaa et seq. (1970).
12 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x (1933 Act), 78ff(a) (1934 Act), 79z-3 (1935 Act), 77yyy (1939
Act), 80a-48 (1940 Act), 80b-17 (Advisers Act) (1970).
15 The "penalties" provision of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1970), does not
contain a clause relating to specific false filings, as do the other statutes. However, false
filings under that Act may still be prosecuted under the general proscription making the
willful violation of a substantive filing provision a crime, or under the Federal False
Statements Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970). For instance, false filings under the 1934
Act are sometimes prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970). See, e.g., United States v.
Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
18 Thus § 49 of the 1940 Act labelled "penalties" provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this subchapter or of
any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, or any person who willfully in any
registration statement, application, report, account, record, or other document
filed or transmitted pursuant to this subchapter or the keeping of which is re-
quired pursuant to section 80a-30(a) of this title makes any untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
prevent the statements made therein from being materially misleading in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, shall upon conviction
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both;
but no person shall be convicted under this section for the violation of any rule,
regulation, or order if he proves that he had no actual knowledge of such rule,
regulation, or order.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1970). In addition, § 37 of the 1940 Act, labelled "larceny and
embezzlement," states:
Whoever steals, unlawfully abstracts, unlawfully and willfully converts to
his own use or to the use of another, or embezzles any of the moneys, funds,
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The SEC has brought civil and administrative actions under all
the statutes; 17 however, the Commission itself does not directly con-
duct criminal prosecutions under any of the securities laws since the
Department of Justice has sole jurisdiction over the conduct of all such
prosecutions.' 8 In practice, the SEC staff initially conducts either a
formal or informal investigation," and where criminal prosecution
appears warranted, it prepares a Criminal Reference Report.2° Pur-
suant to the statutes, the Commission then transmits the Criminal
Reference Report, accompanied by any evidence that it has gathered,
to the Attorney General of the United States who, in his discretion, may
institute the necessary criminal proceedings.2 ' The Department of
Justice then refers the case to a local United States Attorney's Office
which, with the assistance of SEC staff members, presents the case to
a grand jury and conducts the ultimate trial of any indictment re-
turned.
Prior to the mid-1930's, the Department of Justice prosecuted
securities crimes primarily under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute."
securities, credits, property, or assets of any registered investment company shall
be deemed guilty of a crime, and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to the
penalties provided in section 80a-48 of this title. A judgment of conviction or
acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prose-
cution under this section for the same act or acts.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1970). Furthermore, § 217 of the Advisers Act, provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this subchapter, or any
rule, regulation, or order promulgated by the Commission under authority
thereof, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned for
not more than two years, or both.
15 U.S.C. § 801]-17 (1970).
17 The right of SEC staff attorneys to litigate civil injunctive actions initiated by
the Commission was specifically upheld in SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2d
Cir. 1935).
18 Thus, although many of the underlying facts and charges in both the civil and
criminal actions in the "Fifth Avenue Coach Lines" cases were similar, the SEC staff con-
ducted the civil injunctive trial, SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970), while the Office of the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York conducted the parallel criminal litigation, United
States v. Cohn, SEC Litigation Release No. 5194 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In practice, SEC staff
attorneys usually assist local U.S. Attorneys at each stage of a criminal prosecution.
Mathews, Criminal Prosecution Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes:
The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, .39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 901, 913-20
(1971). [hereinafter cited as Mathews].
19 See, e.g., Mathews, Witnesses in SEC Investigations: A Primer for Witnesses and
their Counsel on the Scope of the SEC's Investigatory Power, 3 Rev, of Sec. Reg. No. 9
(May 5, 1970).
29 Mathews, supra note 18, at 914-18.
21 15	 § 77t(b) (1970). The comparable provision in the 1940 Act is 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-41(e) (1970), and, in the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8013-9(e) (1970).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.
1935), cert. denied sub nom. McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S. 650 (1935); United
States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961
(2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied sub nom. Ackerson v. United States, 273 U.S. 702 (1926). See
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Thereafter, securities prosecutions were also brought under the 1933
and 1934 Acts." Even after passage of both the 1940 Act and the
Advisers Act, the Justice Department continued to bring the majority
of investment company or adviser-related criminal cases under the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act."
It appears that only four criminal prosecutions have been sought
under the Advisers Act25
 and in each of these actions the defendants
also Ashby, Federal Regulation of Securities Sales, 22 Ill. L. Rev. 635 (1928). In some
cases the Federal Wire Fraud Statute was also used, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
23
 Mathews, supra note 18, at 907-13. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966), for a recent 1933 Act prosecution. In
United States v. Wolfson, 289 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.
1970) the government charged 1934 Act crimes, whereas in United States v. Sampson,
371 U.S. 75 (1962), criminal violation of the Mail Fraud Statute was alleged.
24 In the 1933 Act the antifraud provision is § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970);
in the 1940 Act it is § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). For a recent prosecution of an investment
adviser under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see United States v. Van Allen, 30 SEC Ann. Rep.
133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), convictions aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States
v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966). For investment
company prosecutions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts see Burns v. United States, 286 F.2d
152 (10th Cir. 1961) and Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953).
25 To the writer's knowledge, the first indictment containing a specific charge of a
substantive Advisers Act crime was in United States v. Hageman, SEC Litigation Re-
lease Nos. 670 (July 25, 1951), 789 (May 7, 1953) and 791 (May 5, 1953), where two
corporations and the defendant Hageman were indicted on charges of mail fraud and
violation of the antifraud provisions of § 206 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 (1970).
No trial was ever held in the case, since the defendants all pleaded guilty to the indict-
ment. The first actual trial of a substantive Advisers Act crime apparently was held in
1960-1961 in United States v. Greenman, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 1835A (Nov. 18,
1960) and 1879 (Jan. 9, 1961) (D. Utah). Greenman, a registered broker-dealer and
investment adviser doing business as "Western Trader & Investor," was indicted on various
fraud counts under the 1933 and 1934 Acts as well as under § 206 of the Advisers Act.
His indictment was based upon alleged activities encompassing the sale of worthless per-
sonal securities to discretionary and advisory clients, and the misappropriation of clients'
funds and securities to finance his personal securities transactions. After full trial, Green-
man was acquitted of every crime charged in the indictment. Id.
In United States v. Todd, SEC' Litigation Release Nos. 1838 (Nov. 17, 1960) and
1845 (Nov. 28, 1960), the defendant, a registered investment adviser doing business as
"The New England Counsellor," was charged with violating the "anti-touting" provisions
of § 17(b) of the 1933 Act and the antifraud provisions of § 206 of the Advisers Act.
The indictment charged that Todd assisted others in accomplishing a fraudulent' distri-
bution of unregistered stock by recommending that stock to his clients without disclosing
that he had received compensation from the issuer and certain underwriters and dealers
to make such recommendations. It was further charged that Todd failed to disclose that
he recommended the stock in order to create a demand for it and raise its price in
order to facilitate distribution. Todd pleaded nolo contendere to the charges. Id. The case
is a landmark since it resulted in the first criminal conviction under the anti-touting
provisions of § 17(b) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970).
In United States v. Seybold, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 2061 (July 18, 1961), 2125
(Oct. 19, 1961) and 2206 (March 7, 1962) the defendant, a registered investment adviser
doing business as "Seybold and McBurney," was indicted for violations of § 206 of the
Advisers Act, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and the Mail Fraud Statute. The indictment charged,
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were charged with violating the antifraud provisions of the Act."
Three of the four cases never reached trial because the defendants
entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere?' In the fourth," the ac-
cused, after trial, was acquitted of all charges." Since there are no
appellate opinions concerning Advisers Act prosecutions, little can be
said about judicial interpretation of the statute's criminal provisions.
Nor can much be learned from an examination of trial records, since
the last case involving a criminal violation of the Advisers Act was
litigated over ten years ago. 8° Prior to United States v. Deutsch, no
case involving violations of the 1940 Act had reached appeal.' Of the
four prosecutions brought under this Act," only one" resulted in a full
jury trial."
inter alia, that the defendant had gained the trust and confidence of clients of the firm,
including persons inexperienced in securities matters, had obtained possession of and sold
certain of their securities, and had converted the proceeds to his own benefit. It was
further alleged that the defendant illegally pledged securities belonging to clients as col-
lateral for personal loans, and deposited various sums of money in clients' bank accounts,
falsely representing to them that the funds were derived from interest or dividends col-
lected on their securities when in fact such securities had been sold and the defendant
had appropriated the proceeds to his own use. Seybold pleaded guilty to every count in
the indictment. Id.
28 Section 206 of the Advisers Act, under which the charges were brought, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails . . . to employ any
device ... to defraud any client...." 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 (1970).
27 See note 25 supra.
23 United States v. Greenman, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 1834A (Nov. 18, 1960)
and 1879 (Jan. 9, 1961) (D. Utah).
28 Id.
30 United States v. Seybold, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 2061 (July 18, 1961), 2125
(Oct. 19, 1961) and 2206 (March 7, 1962).
31 Judge Timbers, writing the opinion in Deutsch, stated that the court was faced
with a question of first impression. 451 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1971).
32 Not until 1960, 20 years after enactment of the 1940 Act, was the first indictment
returned specifically alleging criminal violations of substantive provisions of that Act.
United States v. Crosby, SEC Litigation Release No. 1825 (Nov. I, 1960) (S.D.N.Y.).
In that case defendant Francis Peter Crosby had acquired control of Jefferson Research
Foundation, Inc., and through that entity gained control of Jefferson Custodian Fund,
Inc., a registered investment company. He then liquidated portfolio securities, converted
the cash proceeds to his own use and attempted to sell worthless securities to the fund.
Crosby pleaded guilty to criminal violations of the self-dealing proscriptions of § 17(a)(1)
of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1) (1970), to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970),
and to Rule 10b-5 crimes. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
In 1966, in United States v. Weiner, SEC Litigation Release No. 3460 (March 17,
1966), the former secretary of Revere Fund, Inc., was charged with violations of the
anti-embezzlement and larceny provisions of 37 of the 1940 Act. The information
alleged that Weiner had embezzled certain assets of the Fund, and had transmitted a
materially false and misleading letter to the Commission regarding his activities. This was
the first time that a § 37 crime had ever been charged in an SEC criminal prosecution.
A trial was never held, since Weiner pleaded nolo contendere to the charges. Id.
Also in 1966, in United States v. Jacobs, SEC Litigation Release No. 3568 (Aug. 19,
1966), defendant Jacobs, the former president of Continental Growth Fund, was indicted
for violation of § 37. It was alleged that he misappropriated funds from the Fund's share-
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There appear to be several reasons why the Justice Department
has sought so few criminal prosecutions under either the 1940 Act or the
Advisers Act. First, the SEC has never structured a concerted criminal
enforcement program under either statute. In fact, enforcement of the
Advisers Act, even in civil and administrative actions, has always been
sporadic and lax in comparison to the Commission's intensive enforce-
ment program under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The SEC's Division of
Trading and Markets and the various Regional and Branch Offices
have committed only limited resources to enforcement of the 1940 Act
and the Advisers Act. This reluctance to engage in a more active en-
forcement program appears to be grounded in the belief that the
criminal activities of a registered investment adviser are more success-
fully dealt with by resorting to the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934.Acts.
Second, since criminal prosecution of an investment adviser or an
investment company manager is likely to encompass fraud in the pur-
chase or sale of securities, most prosecutors prefer to base an indict-
ment upon the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
or upon Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,
because of the substantial body of case law interpreting those acts."
By proceeding under these statutes, the government can argue issues
such as burden of proof and applicable defenses with more certainty.
On the other hand, the law relating to both the 1940 Act and the Ad-
visers Act has not been developed and is subject to varying interpreta-
tions by the SEC, the Justice Department and the courts."
Finally, although the SEC Division of Corporate Regulation does
have a small, active branch carrying out a 1940 Act enforcement pro-
gram, this program has always been directed primarily at the adminis-
trative level. Criminal prosecutions, as the small number of cases indi-
cates, have been almost nonexistent, and even civil injunctions are
seldom sought. In light of this dearth of litigated criminal cases under
the 1940 Act, the decision in United States v. Deutsch takes on added
holders through a series of sham transactions. He was also indicted for conspiring with
a broker-dealer to defraud the Fund by causing it to purchase worthless securities.
The indictment was never tried. Id.
$3
 United States v. Burdick, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 4512 (Nov. 6, 1968), 4180
(Dec. 10, 1968).
84 In Burdick, the defendant, a sales representative and divisional manager of Waddell
& Reed, Inc., the investment adviser and underwriter . of United Funds, Inc. (a registered
investment company), was convicted of violating the self-dealing and larceny provisions
of the 1940 Act. Id.
85 See Mathews, supra note 18, at 907-13.
30
 See, e.g., SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1968), where
the court noted that § 17(d) of the 1940 Act had rarely been construed.
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significance because of its almost unique precedential value in future
interpretation of the 1940 Act.
II. THE DECISION IN United States v. Deutsch
A. The Factual Background
In 1967 Jerome Deutsch, an executive of Realty Equities, a real
estate investment company, was given the responsibility of raising $12
million in capital for the company through a private placement of units
of promissory notes." Deutsch's initial efforts to sell the issue met with
failure; only after making contact with Frank D. Mills, an investment
adviser to a number of mutual fundS, was Deutsch able to sell a unit of
notes to Puritan Fund.88 Thereafter, because of Puritan's prestigious
name and influence in the industry, the remainder of the $12 million
issue was easily sold.'" Somewhat later, in October, 1968, Deutsch ne-
gotiated a "private deal" with Mills by which Mills was able to obtain
a unit of notes from Realty Equities at a price substantially below its
market value at that time. 4° Shortly after that purchase, Mills advised
Fidelity Trend Fund to buy a unit from Realty Equities at a price
nearly double that which Mills had paid. At trial the government con-
tended that Mills was accorded a bargain purchase because of his past
services in promoting the Puritan Fund purchase and his contemplated
future services in effecting the Fidelity Trend . Fund sale.'
In an attempt to conceal their private deal, Mills and Deutsch re-
frained from requesting SEC approval, set up nominee accounts with
the banks through which the purchase was consummated and gave
false and misleading evidence to the SEC in its investigation.' Mills
was indicted" for violations of Sections 17(d)" and (e)(1)" of the
37 Each unit consisted of a $500,000, 7%2%, 15-year promissory note, a warrant for
the purchase of 37,500 shares of Realty stock at a gradually ascending price, and the
right to use the note in lieu of cash when exercising the warrant. The purchase price of
the unit was the face amount of the note. The initial exercise price of the warrant was
the market price of Realty stock on the day before the first closing. 451 F,2d 98, 103-04
(2d Cir. 1971).
38 Mills was a senior officer of Fidelity Management and Research Company in
Boston and an investment adviser to twelve affiliated mutual funds, including Puritan
Fund and Fidelity Trend Fund. Id. at 104.
39 In fact, an additional $5 million of units was subsequently authorized for private
sale, and fully sold by June, 1968. Puritan Fund purchased $700,000 of the additional
units. Id.
40 Mills obtained a unit for $537,000 on October 21, 1968, while Fidelity Trend Fund
paid $928,125 per unit for two units on October 24. Id. at 106.
41 Id. at 114-15.
42 Id. at 106-07.
43 Id. at 103. The indictment contained seven counts. Counts One and Two alleged
that Mills had violated § 17(d) by knowingly effecting purchases of securities for his
personal account and for the accounts of Puritan Fund and Fidelity Trend Fund, without
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1940 Act. The former prohibits joint ventures between investment
companies and their affiliates without prior Commission approval; the
latter bars persons affiliated with investment companies from receiving
compensation in transactions in which they act as agents for the com-
panies. Deutsch was similarly indicted for aiding and abetting the 1940
Act crimes under the federal "aiding and abetting" statute." Prior to
trial Mills pleaded guilty to the 17(d) charge and his case was severed
from the Deutsch prosecution. After Deutsch was convicted of aiding
filing the required application and without obtaining SEC approval. Prior to trial, Mills
entered a plea of guilty to the 17(d) violation.
Counts Three and Four charged Deutsch with aiding and abetting Mills' § 17(d)
crimes. Count Five charged Mills with violating § 17(e)(1) by knowingly accepting com-
pensation from Realty Equities while acting as an agent for the purchase of the securities
for the investment companies.
Count Six charged Deutsch with aiding and abetting Mills' § 17(e)(1) crime. Finally,
Count Seven charged Mills and Deutsch with a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5, for
making false statements and material omissions in connection with their sales of securities
to the funds.
After Mills had pleaded guilty to Count One, he was severed from the trial of
Deutsch and did not testify for either side at Deutch's trial. Prior to the trial, the
government consented to the dismissal of Count Seven against both Mills and Deutsch.
Counts Three and Four against Deutsch were dismissed during the trial at the close of
the government's case. After the jury convicted Deutsch on Count Six for aiding and
abetting the 17(e)(1) crime, Counts Two and Five against Mills were dismissed with
consent of the government. Id. at 102 -03.
44 Section 17(d) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of . . . a registered investment
company • • . acting as principal to effect any transaction in which such regis-
tered company ... is a joint or a joint and several participant with such person
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe for the purpose of limiting or preventing participation by such registered
. . . company on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of such
other participant.
Id.
Rule 17d-1, 17 C.F.R. 4 270.17d-1 (1971), provides that an affiliated person of a regis-
tered investment company cannot act as principal in effecting any transaction in connec-
nection with any joint enterprise in which the investment company is a participant
without in advance filing an application with the Commission in order to obtain Com-
mission approval of the transaction.
45 Section 17(e) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment
company . . . (1) acting as agent, to accept from any source any compensation
. . . for the purchase or sale of any property to or for such registered com-
pany . . . .
The section goes on to state that if the affiliated person acts as a broker he may receive
compensation equivalent to a usual and customary broker's commission in the transaction.
Id.
40 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
4264
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and abetting the 17(e) (1) crime, the government dismissed the
17(e) (1) charge against Mills. 47
B. Interpreting Section 17 (e)(1):
"Acting as Agent"
The jury found on the facts presented at Deutsch's trial that
Mills, as an affiliated person of Puritan Fund and Fidelity Trend
Fund, while "acting as agent" had unlawfully accepted compensation
for the purchase or sale of any property to or for the registered com-
panies." At trial, Deutsch did not dispute the facts that Mills was an
affiliated person of both Puritan Fund• and Fidelity Trend Fund, that
both Funds were registered investment companies, or that Mills was
not acting as a broker in the transactions. However, Deutsch did argue
that the phrase "acting as agent" in the statute "[made] the violation
proscribed by section 17(e) (1) incomplete unless the compensation
actually caused a fund to purchase or sell securities."'n He further
argued that there was no proof that the bargain sale to Mills had ac-
tually caused Puritan Fund or Fidelity Trend Fund to purchase the
Realty Equities units.
The trial court rejected Deutsch's proposed rigid construction of
section 17(e) (1), and adopted, instead, the government's contention
that the section would be violated if compensation were paid to an
agent who potentially could influence the fund's decision to buy or
sell the securities in question, even though there was no proof that
such potential influence was actually exercised. The trial judge thus in-
structed the jury that:
The Government does not have to show that Mills was
influenced by the compensation he received or that as a re-
sult of receiving it Mills caused either of the funds to pur-
chase the notes or influenced others in either of the funds to
make such purchase.
• • •
You may find that he acted as an agent if you deter-
mine that he had the power to make investment decisions for
Puritan Fund at the time of its purchases or that as a result
of his position in the company he could influence the deci-
sions regarding the purchases by Fidelity Trend of Realty
Equities notes."
On appeal of Deutsch's conviction, the Second Circuit Court of
47 451 F.2d at 103.
48 Id. at 109, 119.
48 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
50 Id. (emphasis added),
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Appeals was faced with a question of first impression in attempting
to resolve whether under section 17(e) (1) "it is an element of the
offense that the recipient of the compensation take . any action as a
result thereof," and thus, whether use of the verb "acting" in the
statutory phrase "acting as agent" was meant to connote "a Congres-
sional intent to prohibit only gratuities which succeed in influencing
the recipient's conduct.' Writing for the court, Judge Timbers, a
former General Counsel of the SEC, noted that no court in a civil or
criminal case had ever discussed the intent of Congress in enacting
section 17(e) (1). He further noted that there was no helpful legisla-
tive history specifically dealing with that provision." The court, how-
ever, did find guidance in general legislative history declaring the
policies and purposes underlying passage, as a whole, of the 1940 Act:
The Senate and House Reports indicate that the Act was
designed primarily to correct the abuses of self-dealing which
had produced injury to stockholders of investment compa-
nies. Four sections of the Act, including Section 17, were
aimed specifically at insuring the independence of manage-
ment and its fidelity to stockholders. Congress recognized
that its existing laws were inadequate to prevent the abuses
of self-dealing. Several times during the hearings, Senators
questioned SEC attorneys on their inability to obtain con-
victions, thus evincing a concern about the difficulties of
obtaining convictions for abuse of trust in the investment
company industry. . . . The Act was thus designed in part
quite clearly to establish broad standards which would more
easily enable the Government to convict affiliated persons for
self-dealing in the management of investment companies—
an industry the very nature of which made it particularly
difficult to gather proof."
51 Id.
52 Although acknowledging that 17(e)(1) had been considered in civil court cases,
Judge Timbers found no prior "attempt to unravel" the proper meaning of 17(e)(1).
Id. at 107-08.
5a Id. at 108. The court also found guidance in the following recent SEC adminis-
trative disciplinary opinions: Bernard Cornfeld, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9094 (March 1, 1971); Provident Management Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970); Dishy, Easton and Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8702 (Sept. 23, 1969); Consumer-Investor Planning Corp., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8542 (Feb. 20, 1969); and Imperial Financial Services, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7684 (Aug. 26, 1965). 451 F.2d at 109-10. It
should be noted that these administrative cases were settled through negotiation prior to
trial. In the author's opinion, the precedential value of opinions in administrative cases
settled by consent is tenuous. The very willingness of the parties in such proceedings to
forego the opportunity to research and submit arguments based upon the applicable facts
and law deprives the proceeding of the quality of deliberation and consideration which
might elevate the consent judgment to precedent. One cannot ignore the extent to which
extra-legal considerations may motivate many parties to give up the fight and consent.
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In light of the import of this general legislative history, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected Deutsch's contentions and construed section 17
(e) (1) in a manner even broader than that of the trial court. The
court stated:
We find it hard to believe . . . that a Congress which
had recognized that the investment company industry "of-
fer[edj manifold opportunities for exploitation by unscru-
pulous managements" . . . meant that an offense was com-
plete only when the affiliated person acted as a result of
receiving something of value. Rather, we believe that the
more reasonable interpretation is that an offense under § 17
(e) (1) is complete when the compensation is delivered and
received with the forbidden intent . . . . The abuse which
§ 17(0(1) was designed to prevent—affiliated persons op-
erating under conflicts of interest—was complete when Mills
received the compensation, even if he never exerted any in-
fluence on Realty's behalf."
Accordingly, the court found that as soon as Mills purchased the
Realty note at a reduced price, he was inhibited by a conflict of inter-
est that might becloud his judgment, to the detriment of the funds'
shareholders. This was, the court stated, the very type of conflict of
interest which the statute was intended to proscribe. As a result, no
actual proof of impairment or actual damage to a fund and/or its
shareholders was required."
The result of the court's broad construction of the statute is that
"an affiliated person is acting as agent within the meaning of section
17(e) (1) in all cases when he is not acting as broker for the invest-
ment company," and that the proscriptions of the subsection apply
even to affiliated persons who do not have the capacity to influence
investment decisions." Thus an affiliated person acting as broker can
accept only the equivalent of the usual and customary brokerage com-
missions in connection with the purchase or sale of securities for the
fund; an affiliated person not acting as broker, even if he is not in a
position to influence the fund's investment decisions, can accept no
consideration whatsoever in connection with the fund's purchase or
sale of securities."
64 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 109-10. The court cited cases showing that the payment of the gratuity
was sufficient to sustain the violation. See United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966) and Howard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 838 (1965).
60 451 F. 2d at 111.
67 Id. at 110-11.
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C. Requisite Criminal Intent Under
Section 17(e) (1)
As indicated by the Second Circuit, section 17 (e) (1) is violated
only if the compensation is accepted "with the forbidden intent.""
However, what constitutes "intent" under the securities laws is not
clear. Since 1933, various courts have struggled with the particular
nature of criminal intent required to sustain convictions under myriad
provisions of the federal securities laws. The nature of the particular
intent required varies from statute to statute, and, indeed, among
various provisions of any one of the statutes.°
Deutsch argued that the requisite criminal intent to support a
section 17(e) (1) crime was proof "that the compensation was given
with the intent to influence."" Indeed, the trial judge had charged the
jury that, in order to convict, it must find that the compensation was
given and received with the intent to influence . Mills.°' However, the
Second Circuit chose to interpret section 17(e) (1) in a manner con-
sistent with analagous federal "gratuity statutes" and held that there
is no requirement to show an "intent to influence." 02 The court stated:
The paying of compensation is an evil in itself, even though
the payor does not corruptly intend to influence the affiliated
person's acts, for it tends to bring about preferential treat-
ment in favor of the payor which can easily injure the ben-
eficiaries of investment companies. Congress recognized that
affiliated persons had manifold opportunities for self-dealing
and designed a statute to remove the potential for conflicts
of interest by prohibiting the receipt of compensation "for
the purchase or sale of any property . . . ." We hold that to
read into § 17(e) (1) a requirement of intent to influence
would frustrate this statutory purpose."
The Deutsch opinion makes it clear, therefore, that as in the case of
other federal "gratuity statutes," the only proof of criminal intent
required to sustain a conviction under section 17(e) (1) is proof of
an "intent to give and accept a gratuity in appreciation of past or
future conduct."" Applying this test to the facts which the jury rea-
58 Id. at 109.
58 Mathews, supra note 18, at 950-59.
60 451 F.2d at 112.
81 The trial judge had charged the jury that it "must determine whether or not the
compensation was accepted for the purchase of securities by either Puritan Fund in
February or June or by Fidelity Trend Fund in October." Id. at 112 n.18.
62 Id. at 112-13.
83 Id.
04 Id.
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sonably could have found based on evidence presented at trial, the
court found sufficient , proof of requisite criminal intent and sustained
Deutsch's conviction 6s
The Deutsch court's broad interpretation of Section 17(e) (1) of
the 1940 Act is a clear indication that the court will scrutinize those
actions of investment company managers or advisers which might
lead to conflicts of interest. The meaning which the court has given
to the phrases "acting as agent" and "criminal intent" should warn
potential violators of the criminal liability for transactions involving
conflicts of interest. Certainly, the court's holding will ease the govern-
ment's burden of proof in future prosecutions. Rather than having to
prove an intent to influence', the prosecution will merely have to show
that an illegal transaction occurred. 'Consequently, Deutsch is likely
to increase the deterrent effect of both the 1940 Act and the Advisers
Act.
III. RULE VIOLATIONS: MISDEMEANOR VERSUS
FELONY TREATMENT
One area of conflict which has never been resolved by litigation is
the status of rule violations under the 1940 and Advisers Acts. It is
clear that a statutory violation of either act constitutes a felony. Sec-
tion 49 of the 1940 Act and Section'217 of the Advisers Act provide
that willful violation of those statutes: may be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than two years."
Since the maximum term of imprisonment that can be imposed exceeds
one year, a 1940 Act or Advisers Act crime is automatically a felony,
even though no prison term may actually be imposed." Ignorance of
the law is not a defense; competent persons are presumed to know the
law pertaining to their conduct and are charged with a duty to obey
it. Thus a claim of lack of knowledge of a particular statutory pro-
scription would not constitute a valid defense to a felony conviction
under either act."
65 Id. at 113. In affirming Deutsch's conviction, the court rejected several other
proffered defenses: (1) that § 17(e)(1)' is so vague as to be void under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
' statutory element of compensation; (3) that the trial court's admission of Mills' statements
• regarding the 17(d) crime was contrary to the hearsay rule and deprived Deutsch of his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (4) that Deutsch was denied a fair •trial as a
result of certain remarks made by the trial judge and the prosecutor regarding the failure
of Mills to appear as a witness at the trial; (5) that the prosecutor's summation improperly
contained misstatements of law and inflammatory remarks; and (6) that Deutsch could
not be convicted of aiding the 17(e)(1) crime if Mills had not been convicted of the
violation of 17(e)(1). Id. at 113-18.
00 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48,.80b-17 (1970).
67
 18 U.S.C. 1 1(1) (1970).
68 See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7•F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925); see also
Mathews, supra note 18, at 950-51.
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Rule violations, however, are treated differently. Section 49 of the
1940 Act provides that violations of rules or regulations promulgated
under that Act do not constitute crimes if lack of knowledge of the
rule is proven." Conversely, if actual knowledge of a rule is proven,
violation would bé both criminal and felonious 7 6
 There is no interme-
diate proVision in the 1940 Act, as there is in the 1934 Act, where a
"no-knowledge" rule violation can constitute a misdemeanor." By way
of comparison, the Advisers Act contains neither a "no-knowledge"
misdemeanor provision nor a provision like Section 49 of the 1940
Act stating that a rule violation, without actual knowledge, does not
create criminal liability. Rather, Section 217 of the Advisers Act pro-
vides that any person who "willfully" violates a rule is guilty of a
felony."
It is clear from opinions in criminal cases brought under other
federal securities statutes that "knowledge" connotes more of a con-
sciousness of guilt than "willfulness"; a "person can willfully violate
an SEC rule even if he does not know of its existence."" It has been
held that the word "willful," even in criminal statutes, "means no
more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is
doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose that he is
breaking the law."" Conversely, "knowledge," while not requiring
actual awareness of the specific language or number of a statutory
provision or rule, does require awareness of the "standards" contained
in the provision or rule. To prove lack of knowledge under the federal
securities laws, there must be sufficient evidence showing ignorance
of the substance of the rule.75 Since willfulness and knowledge are
separate and distinct concepts," lack of knowledge probably would
not be a defense to a felony conviction for an Advisers Act rule vio-
66 Section 49 provides that "no person shall be convicted under this section for the
violation of any rule, regulation, or order if he proves that he had no actual knowledge
of such rule, regulation, or order." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1970).
70
 Since a rule violation with knowledge is a willful violation, it is criminal under
§ 49. Because § 49 further states that such a crime is punishable by two years' imprison-
ment, it is thus a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1970).
71
 There has been a flurry of recent litigation involving construction of the "no-
knowledge" misdemeanor treatment of rule violations under § 32(a) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Peitz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970) ;
United States v. Mandel, 296 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; and United States v. Lilley,
291 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
72 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1970).
78
 United States v. Peitz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Herlands,
Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 Va. L. Rev. 139, 145-49
(1934).
74 American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925).
75
 United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989, 993 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
76
 See Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions under the Federal Securities Laws and Related
Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
901, 950-51 (1971).
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lation. However, no case brought under the Advisers Act has addressed
this issue.
There is no apparent reason, nor any legislative history, justify-
ing or explaining why the "no-knowledge" rule violations are treated
differently in criminal prosecutions under the various securities stat-
utes. Perhaps this inconsistency was a result of legislative oversight.
Whatever the reason, it is submitted that the criminal provisions of the
different securities laws regarding felony or misdemeanor treatment
should be harmonized.
IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
There is an effort under way in both the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government to supplant the various criminal
provisions contained in Title 18 of the U.S. Code and the myriad'other
federal statutes with a modern, uniform Federal Criminal Code. In
January, 1971, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crim-
inal Laws published a Final Report which contained its version of a
Proposed Federal Criminal Code. 77 The proposal, which is presently
under consideration by the Senate Subcommittee On Criminal Laws
and Procedures, contains provisions which substantially alter the
criminal sanctions presently imposed by the 1940 and Advisers Acts. 78
One apparent weakness of the proposed Code is that sufficient
consultation was not made with attorneys having securities law exper-
tise and others functioning in the securities markets as to their view
of the effect of the Code on existing provisions of the federal securities
laws. The recommendations of the National Commission concerning
1940 Act and Advisers Act crimes are particularly objectionable. That
Commission has recommended that all federal crimes, including viola-
tions of the securities laws, be classified into six categories, in descend-
ing order of seriousness: Class A, B and C felonies; Class A and B
misdemeanors; and petty "infractions." Felony Classes A, B and C
would carry maximum sentence terms of thirty, fifteen and seven
years, respectively. Misdemeanor Classes A and B would carry maxi-
mum terms of one year and thirty days, respectively. 7° Under present
law, all 1940 Act crimes are felonies carrying a maximum prison term
of two years and/or a maximum fine of $10,000. However, under the
National Commission's Proposed Code, 1940 Act and Advisers Act
crimes would never be felonies, but instead would constitute Class A
77 Final Report of The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
A Proposed New Federal Criminal Code (1971) [hereinafter cited as Final Report].
78 Id. § 1772. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
79 Final Report, supra note 77, § 3002, 3201.
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misdemeanors carrying a maximum one year term of imprisonment and
a maximum fine of $1,000. 88
It is submitted that adoption of these changes in the criminal
penalties under the 1940 and Advisers Acts would dangerously dilute
the prophylactic effect of the statutes, and, as such, would be detri-
mental to the public interest. Historically, investment advisers have
been held to.the strictest fiduciary standard in their relationships with
investment compani6. Therefore, criminal penalties for unlawful acts
arising from this relationship should be severe, not minor. If the Na-
tional Commission's proposals are enacted, the maximum punishment
which could be imposed for 1940 Act criminal violations, such as the
self-dealing situation which occurred in Deutsch, would be less severe,
economically, than the administrative sanctions that the SEC or self-
regulatory bodies such• as the National Association of. Securities Deal-
ers (NASD) or the NevV York Stock Exchange could impose for the
same violation. 81
At the very least, crimes under the 1940 Act and the Advisers
Act based on fraud or self-dealing, or any false filings pursuant to the
applicable filing provisions of those acts, should be treated as Class C
felonies, bearing a maximum sentence, under the present range pro-
posed, of seven years imprisonment and/or a fine of $5,000. 82 Such
Class C felony treatment has already been applied to registration and
antifraud crimes under the 1933 Act, manipulation and antifraud
crimes under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and false state-
ment crimes under the 1933 and 1939 Acts." No persuasive reasons
have been offered as to why similar criminal violations under the 1940
Act and the Advisers Act should not also be accorded felony treatment.
At a time in our history when institutionalization of the securities
markets is rapidly increasing, and when millions of public investors
are entrusting more and more of their savings to investment company
managers and investment advisers, enlightened public policy demands
that criminal breaches of trust and other criminal abuses committed
by such fiduciaries be subject to penalties more, not less, severe than
those presently applicable.
Finally, it is suggested that a fuller consideration be given to the
80 Id.	 1772, Comment at 239; § 3201(1)(d), 3301(1)(c).
81 The NYSE Constitution provides • for fines of up to $25,000 for an individual
member and $100,000 for a member firm or member corporation in lieu of suspension or
expulsion. NYSE Constitution, Art. XIV, 13, 2 CCH NYSE Guide II 1663 at 1087-1088
(1971); The NASD Rules of Fair Practice provide for a fine of up to $5,000. NASD Rules
of Fair Practice, Art. V, 1, CCH NASD Manual ti 2301 (1971).
82 Final Report, supra note 77, II§ 3002, 3201(1)(c), 3301(1)(b). In fact, in the
writer's opinion, all the proposed maximum fines contained in the Proposed Code should
be increased substantially.
• 88 Id. g 1772.
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effects of the proposed changes on the securities laws. Attorneys with
securities law expertise ,should be consulted as to any revisions. In
this way changes can be made which will standardize the existing in-
consistent criminal provisions contained in the securities statutes; at
the same time, expert opinions can be given concerning the severity
of penalties which should be imposed by each law.
CONCLUSION
The fact that few prosecutions have been sought under the 1940
Act, and its companion statute, the Advisers Act, should not be viewed
as evidence that the criminal provisions under those Acts are ineffec-
tive. Rather, it would appear that the deterrent effect of such criminal
provisions, coupled with the close regulation of investment companies
by the SEC, has in recent years severely curtailed criminal transgres-
sions by investment company managers and/or investment advisers.
After Deutsch, the deterrent effect of such provisions probably will
be even greater.
Notwithstanding the success of the Deutsch prosecution, it can
be expected that, absent passage of a new, comprehensive criminal
code, securities law prosecutions involving investment advisers and/or
investment company managers or affiliated persons will continue to be
brought primarily under the criminal provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts and the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, because of the familiarity
which prosecutors have with these laws. Advisers and 1940 Acts pros-
ecutions will probably continue to be infrequent because of the more
technical nature of those statutes and the unfamiliarity of most pros-
ecutors. However, in the 1940 Act prosecutions that are in fact
brought, the Deutsch decision will probably ease the government's
burden in obtaining convictions by encouraging courts to construe
1940 Act provisions flexibly. In this way, the courts can achieve the
dominant statutory purpose of the Investment Company Act by at-
tempting to provide investor protection through the elimination of
investment managers' conflicts of interest. Finally, it is suggested that
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code be modified to make statutory
violations of the 1940 Act and the Advisers Act Class C felonies, with
strict maximum penalties of seven years imprisonment and/or a $5,000
fine. These revisions would insure close regulation of investment com-
pany managers and advisers and would maximize investor protection.
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